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ABSTRACT
Arguments in support of the adequacy of civilian-based defense generally 
assume that military aggressors are bound to make massive use of brutal 
force In defiance of that assumption, the paper starts by showing how a 
military invasion that refrains from employing deadly force is conceivable 
The basic principle behind such an invasion is that military forces neutralize 
nonviolent actions and do not suppress them Tactics that are guided by the 
principle avoid the counterproductive effects of the use of lethal force while 
clogging the channels of resistance The second part of the paper indicates 
ways m which a civilian-based defense could effectively anticipate and react to 
such tactics It is argued that although the population s means for struggle are 
more limited than under mdst other circumstances, the invaded country can 
never be forced into total submission
NEED MILITARY AGGRESSORS KILL PEOPLE?1
I
In the late 1950s Sir Stephen King-Hall, a then retired naval officer, 
urged the United Kingdom and other western nations to prepare themselves 
against the threat of Soviet occupation His advice was to complement 
conventional military defense with orgamzed nonviolent resistance A social 
defense system, he stated, would coat Western Europe with an extra security 
layer and provide a harmless substitute for the nuclear deterrent2 Although 
King-Hall s ideas were not taken seriously at the time, they have now been 
accepted and elaborated by a considerable number of scholars 3 For instance, 
the currently leading authority on the subject, Gene Sharp, has recently 
argued that nonviolent or civilian-based defense could make Western Europe 
unconquerable 4 By unconquerable, Sharp does not mean that a 
nonmilitary defense could stop a military invasion at the borders Like King- 
Hall and others, he claims rather that nonviolent action could make a 
military invasion so unprofitable for the aggressor that the latter would be 
forced to retreat To support this claim, two mam arguments have been 
developed The first one is that the use of military violence against 
nonviolent civilians erodes the support basis of the invasion It damages the 
morale of the troops, tempers domestic enthusiasm for the invasion, and 
increases the opposition to the invasion by other countries The second 
argument rests on the observation that the success of an invasion is 
dependent upon the compliance of the population with the occupier s rule It 
claims that a nonviolently resisting population withholds that compliance 
and cannot be coerced into complying by the use or threat of violence
The two arguments make many assumptions that invite doubt In this 
paper I will investigate only one of them, namely, the assumption that a 
military invasion needs to inflict lethal violence on nonviolent civilians 5 
Both arguments claim that it is the futility of such violence that makes 
military invasions fail Hence, if it is the case that mvasions can do without 
lethal violence, the arguments will, at the very least, require revision Taking 
up the task of revamping the argumentative basis of civilian-based defense is 
what this article is ultimately about By assembling the tightest possible case 
against the viability of nonviolent resistance, the paper aims [indirectly] to 
highlight its resilience and versatility
First, I will show how a military invasion that refrains from employing 
deadly force is conceivable The basic principle behind such an invasion is 
that military forces neutralize nonviolent actions and do not suppress them 
Tactics that are guided by the principle avoid the counterproductive effects of 
the use of lethal violence while clogging the channels of resistance The 
second part of the paper indicates ways in which a civilian-based defense 
could effectively anticipate and react to such tactics I will argue that,
2although the population s means for struggle are more limited than under 
most other circumstances, the invaded country can never be forced into total 
submission
The suspicion may arise that the issue addressed m this paper merely 
deflects attention from what many critics view as the mam weakness of 
nonviolent resistance its inability to protect the population against a ruthless, 
brutal, and potentially genocidal enemy 6 Civilian-based defense seems to be 
least effective when confronted with the gravest and most horrible threats, 
therefore, identifying the danger for civilian-based defense as military action 
that refrains from the use of lethal violence seems little more than cynical
There are two ways of responding to this charge The first one is by 
advancing the claim that, whatever the intentions of the aggressor may be, 
massive use of violence to carry out these intentions would be 
counterproductive Given the boldness of the claim, I cannot hope to defend 
it within the confines of this paper The second response is more appropriate 
in the current context It grants that massive violence may succeed in 
crushing nonviolent resistance, but points out that reasons of domestic or 
international support will, as a matter of fact, prevent many aggressors from 
exercising such violence For these aggressors, military invasions that rely on 
low-level, non-lethal violence are the most attractive option Thus, 
analyzing the implications of choosing that option is not a cynical move but a 
realistic anticipation of potential threats to a nonviolent national defense
n
The requirement to abstain from using lethal force is, when applied to 
civilians, no more than an affirmation of a rule that is basic to most modern 
societies When applied to soldiers, however, the requirement almost 
amounts to a contradiction in terms For soldiers differ from civilians 
precisely because the exerase of force, including lethal force, is part of their 
social function On the other hand, military operations do not intrinsically 
produce casualties They do so only when the political goals they serve 
cannot be reached except by causing death m the opponent s ranks 
Moreover, as a rule, it is when the opponent resists with military operations 
of its own, that reaching political goals requires lethal violence Hence, it is 
the clash between military operations, rather than military operations per se, 
that results m a high toll in human lives
Plain as this may be, it yields the not so obvious conclusion that the 
road to victory against a nonviolent opponent need not run through killing 
fields In the current world, war stands for violent confrontations Winning 
the confrontation has become an end m itself, obscuring the political 
objectives that instigated the war Nonviolent resistance refocuses on these
3objectives, it aims at frustrating their attainment instead of destroying the 
means for their pursuit7 To regard a nonviolent adversary on the same level 
as a military adversary, and to define victory as the elimination of resistance, 
is sure to produce widespread bloodshed But it is a circuitous way of bringing 
the goals of the military action closer to fulfillment Unlike military 
resistance, civilian resistance poses no threat to the lives of soldiers There is 
no need, then, for the soldiers to kill the resisting civilians Winning the war 
and military victory lose their traditional bloodstained meamng, and deaths 
and injuries can even become obstacles for the pursuit of the invasion s goals
If not through the use of lethal force, how can armed forces, geared as 
they are towards exercising that force, be the means for attaining political 
ends7 Armed forces can still function in many ways that are off limits to 
nonviolent resisters All forms of coercion that do not inherently cause death 
or serious injuries remain within the arsenal of the invasion troops How 
and whether they will be employed depends on the goals that the invasion 
troops ultimately want to achieve To underscore the potential of non-lethal 
military action, I will assume that these goals are ambitious Specifically, the 
argument postulates that the invasion aims at total control over the other 
country s political and economic life, either by establishing a colomal rule, or 
by installing a puppet regime Motives that undergird that aim may include 
reasons of material gam, the desire to reinforce one s geopolitical power 
position, or ideological considerations
The broad-gauged nature of the invasion s purpose requires the 
military aggressor to prepare for a long-term occupation Crossmg the border 
and spreading out over the whole country is the first and easiest step Tanks 
and other heavy artillery are of little use then or at any other stage of the 
action Lightly armed soldiers m rapid all-terrain vehicles have far greater 
mobility and will appear less threatemng to the invaded population Civilian 
technical and administrative personnel can, from the very start, accompany 
the soldiers to accentuate the peaceful character of the invasion In the 
country under attack, such measures may not raise the tolerance for the 
occupation by much, but within the international community they should 
succeed m fostering a more lenient view towards the military intervention
Once the first wave of occupation troops has spread out, nonviolent 
resistance can be expected to become fully activated It is useful to distinguish 
among four types of resistance institutional noncooperation, defiance of the 
occupier s regime, bodily obstruction, and symbolic intervention 
Institutional noncooperation goes into effect when occupiers try to adapt the 
invaded society s institutional apparatus (comprising mainly economic 
enterprises and the state bureaucracy) for their own purposes By 
discontinuing or disturbing the functioning of the apparatus through strikes, 
work delays and sabotage the nonviolent resistance makes it into an 
unreliable tool that hinders rather than helps the invader achieve its aims
4Defiance of the occupier s regime is a response to the invader s promulgation 
of new decrees that try to coax, con, or coerce the population into submission 
Through disobedience (e g , ignoring curfew), affirmation of autonomy (e g , 
displaying the national flag), or even overcompliance (e g , giving oneself 
up to be arrested) the new order is scorned, its authority ridiculed, and its 
power emaciated
Noncooperation and defiance attack the occupation s infrastructure 
They respectively prevent the invader from taking over the existing 
organizational structures and from putting up effective new ones Bodily 
obstruction and symbolic intervention strike at the occupation’s 
superstructure, that is, at the morale of the troops Symbolic intervention 
tactics include protest marches to make clear that the troops are unwanted 
and persuasion campaigns to convince them that the invasion is unjustified 
Bodily obstruction refers mainly to limiting the troops movements by 
forming living walls on roads, railroad tracks, and in front of buildings This 
compels the troops either to use force, which could cause them moral distress, 
or accept temporarily a humiliating retreat
Every type and form of nonviolent action could be combatted with 
violence Strikers, protesters, and violators of rules could be imprisoned, 
cudgeled down, shot at, or even tortured But if one imprisons strikers, they 
are not put to work, if one cudgels down protesters, they will not become 
more tolerant of their assailants, and if one starts shooting or torturing 
violators of rules, the mvaded society is killed off, not governed To be sure, 
it is conceivable that if enough brutal examples are set, the population will be 
finally forced into submission But if the purpose is to establish a regime that 
does not require soldiers on every street comer and m every factory, another 
strategy is called for to smother the resistance Such a strategy fights the 
resistance on its own terms, it takes over the initiative by responding to each 
of the four forms of nonviolent action in ways that violate the expectations 
that guide them
Institutional noncooperation is guided by the expectation that to some 
extent the occupier has to rely on the mvaded society s institutions m order to 
control that society s population To render this noncooperation ineffective, 
the occupation forces initially could abstain from attempts at exerting 
influence through the existing organizational channels If businesses and 
governmental services go on strike or engage m other boycotts, the invader 
could stand idly by and wait for the campaign to drown in its own 
pointlessness When normalcy returns, the troops could launch their own 
institutional noncooperation campaign With limited violence, the 
economic and bureaucratic machinery could be deregulated or even be 
brought to a virtual standstill Transportation and communication could be 
delayed and entrances to factories and office buildings could be sporadically 
barricaded The purpose of these largely nonviolent actions would be to
5blackmail the country s leadership into conceding part of its power to the 
occupier There would be no need to dispose of the country s regime it could 
continue to function as a front of legitimate authority for the gradual erosion 
of its real power Ideally, the transferral of power would have to be paced in 
such a way that it becomes impossible for the population to determine 
whether the laws and instructions that are issued spring forth from the 
resistance leadership or the occupations command
Defiance of the occupier s regime is guided by the idea that the 
aggressor will want to impose its own rules on the invaded society Since 
obedience to these rules can be withheld, the resistance expects that through 
defiance of the occupier s decrees, the aims of the invasion can be frustrated 
To disturb that expectation and to neutralize potential acts of defiance, the 
occupier could follow two, not mutually exclusive, principles The first 
principle is not to issue orders and regulations that provide the population 
with rallying points for defiance campaigns The second principle is to decree 
rules that confuse the resistance and transform it into a caricature In line 
with the first principle, curfews, prohibitions on displaying patriotic symbols, 
and restrictions on holding protest demonstrations would all be carefully 
avoided In any case, since such limitations are mostly issued m response to 
violent protests, there would be no need to impose them m the case under 
consideration The preservation of law and order could safely be left in the 
hands of the indigenous judicial system However, in line with the second 
principle, the occupier could make its presence felt by promulgating decrees 
that, if massively disobeyed, would hurt the resistance by ridiculing and 
exhausting it Such mock decrees could demand the population to respect the 
laws of the country, ask people to stay inside in the middle of the night, or 
even instigate them to undertake certain forms of protests In addition, laws 
could be adopted that discriminate in favor of certain parts of the population 
and commands could be issued that contradict each other
The symbolic intervention actions of the resistance are predicated on 
the expectation that the troops are misinformed about their mission that they 
have been told that they are liberators rather than aggressors, or that they 
have been made to believe that they come to restore justice rather than 
commit injustice That expectation need not be valid, for it is not 
inconceivable that the aggressor s country has grievances that make its 
population feel justified m invading the other country If so, symbolic 
intervention actions of the resistance may prove to be largely harmless 8 If, 
on the contrary, the invasion troops are misinformed about the reasons for 
ti e invasion, persuasion campaigns of the resistance could easily damage the 
morale of the troops To counter such campaigns, the occupier should try to 
make the mass communication channels unavailable to the resistance and 
use them, instead, to put up a persuasion campaign of its own with the 
purpose of justifying the invasion Because the resistance would not be
6violently suppressed, propaganda that supports the invader s activities could 
be more effective than under harsher occupation circumstances
Bodily obstruction limits the enemy s movements The resistance 
expects these limitations to confront the troops with the dilemma of either 
acquiescing to them or removing them with violence However, there are 
several other ways to deal with them First of all, the limitations could be 
circumvented or avoided by taking other roads or choosing other means of 
transport and, thus, remain unacknowledged Secondly, the obstacles— 
human or otherwise—could be removed and earned oft by force without 
using violence 9 Finally, the enthusiasm of the resistance for engaging in 
bodily obstruction could be undermined by outperforming the resistance 
This means that the aggressor could itself apply obstruction methods to such 
an extent that use of them by the resistance might seem to contnbute to the 
invader s cause rather than its own This tactic has already been mentioned 
as part of a counter-noncooperation campaign and would, at any rate, be part 
of the invader s action repertoire
The ground rule for reacting to nonviolent resistance in each of its four 
forms is to substitute patience for violence The occupier should not expect 
the speedy collapse of defense efforts, but must gradually undermine them by, 
on the one hand, destabilizing the society s normal way of life and by, on the 
other hand, instigating people to invest energy in pointless anti-occupation 
actions Thus, on the assumption that the invaded population failed to 
anticipate such a strategy, a condition of emergency is created with which 
civilian-based defense is unable to cope The resulting confusion and 
exhaustion may produce a climate of helplessness among the people that 
make them come to regard the reinstatement of order—any order—as 
desirable They may become convinced that nonviolent resistance is 
counterproductive and that, in order to prevent the country from sliding into 
chaos, cooperation with the invader is necessary In the wake of that 
realization, the occupation forces could, without major opposition, increase 
their control over the state By this process, they would, in the end, be able to 
install a regime in the invaded country that meets the objectives behind the 
invasion
However, it may take months or even years before the invader can 
reap any benefits from this strategy In the meanwhile, there will be a 
pressing need to defray the costs of the invasion For, although these costs 
will be far lower than the costs of conventional warfare, they are likely to be a 
considerable burden to the invaders national budget To solve this 
essentially financial problem, the invader can try to levy an indirect tax 
within the occupied country For instance, the invader can bring the food 
distribution chain under its control, provide food freely to its own troops, and 
hike prices for the rest of the population In addition, goods, ranging from 
precious natural resources to machines and consumer products, can be
7shipped out of the country to be sold in the home country or on the 
international market Such moves are largely invulnerable to 
noncooperation actions, for they do not rely on compliance of the producers10 
By depending on its own means of transportation, the invader would also be 
less vulnerable to resistance actions aimed at dislocating the distribution 
infrastructure At best, then, the resistance could fight back with obstruction 
actions But, as has been indicated above, the invasion troops have effective 
ways of neutralizing such actions, so that there is little that the population 
can do to hinder the invader s organized pillage In short, economic plunder 
could compensate for the financial cost of the invasion and allow the 
occupation troops to continue their largely nonviolent attrition warfare
m
Military forces can follow a course of action that is largely not violent, 
but they are not restrained by it Paradoxically, this implies that they have 
more tactics at their disposal that are not violent than does a civilian-based 
defense For some, such tactics (arresting people, for instance) can only be 
effective when backed up with the threat of violence In theory [at least], 
military operations contain a larger potential for action that is not violent 
than civilian resistance operations 11 How that potential can be successfully 
used has been explained in the previous section The question that remains 
to be answered is can a civilian-based defense employ tactics that would 
effectively thwart such a nonviolent military strategy7 Or do the military s 
larger acting capacities render it invincible7
In part, the effectiveness of nonviolent military action rests on a 
surprise factor Armed forces are not expected to behave in a nonviolent 
manner and, as a result, if they do behave that way, they trigger inefficient 
forms of resistance But nonviolent military strategies can be anticipated and 
appropriate responses [to them] developed The rule governing these 
responses should be that active resistance is put on hold as long as the 
invader does not pose a real threat to the country s institutions and laws If 
applied, this rule would avoid mass mobilizations as an initial response to 
invasion and make the invader s mock decree policy lose its sting Energy to 
resist would be conserved in this way, and the invader would, at the very 
least need much more time to succeed m a war of attrition
The occupier s obstruction of transportation, production and 
communication is much more difficult to counter The only method that 
may be somewhat effective is to obstruct the obstructors If, for instance, 
troops block a road, nonviolent resisters could, in their turn block the troops 
It is doubtful, however, whether this tactic can force the invader to give up its 
obstruction campaign Whereas military troops can remove blockades of 
nonviolent protesters, nonviolent protesters cannot remove blockades of
8military troops Hence, civilian-based defense suffers from a serious 
operational handicap
Civilian-based defense is also largely powerless against organized 
pillage Theoretically, people could destroy their goods before they are taken 
away from them but, in practice, this solution would be worse than the 
problem It is impossible to know in advance which goods the invader will 
want to confiscate, hence, only by completely annihilating its wealth could 
the population prevent the invader s pillage campaign Apart from being too 
draconian, such a measure would also pulverize the economic basis of the 
resistance and, thus, hasten its collapse
Since the invader s obstruction and pillage campaigns are largely 
invulnerable to direct nonviolent resistance, the invaded country could try to 
halt them by mobilizing the international community against the invader 
Tough economic sanctions and political ostracism may, if internationally 
supported, be so costly to the invader as to force it to give up its occupation 
However, it is dangerous for a civilian-based defense to bet too heavily on 
international backing The record of the effectiveness of international 
sanctions is not particularly enchanting If the invader belongs to powerful 
alliances, chances are that the invasion will be widely condoned rather than 
condemned Even if this is not the case, there are at least two reasons not to 
bank on the willingness of the international community to sanction the 
invader First of all, the invader employs predominantly nonviolent 
methods, so that the occupation is unlikely to produce the moral outcry that 
is typically needed to prod nations into action In addition, third nations will 
be tempted to blame the victim They will be inclined to argue that, if only 
the attacked country had put up a military defense, the invader would have 
reframed from aggression They may conclude, therefore, that the attacked 
country should be able to deal with a military occupier without expecting 
outside help
Symbolic intervention campaigns that weaken the morale of the 
enemy troops could turn out to constitute the most effective resistance 
strategy However, as has been observed earlier, this will be so only if the 
leaders of the aggressor country blatantly misinform their people about the 
objectives of the invasion On the assumption that this is not the case, the 
response of a civilian-based defense to a largely nonviolent military 
occupation is bound to be weak At best, it can prevent ineffective anti­
occupation mobilizations and, in this way, prolong the life of the resistance 
But since this allows the invader to continue to reap the benefits from its 
pillage strategy and to continue to undercut people s will to resist by 
deregulating their day-to-day living patterns, the defeat or retreat of the 
invader is unlikely
9And yet, time and victory are not, by definition, at the side of the 
invader Traditionally, a military victory evokes images of triumphant 
generals who impose their wills on a cowering populace Such a victory is 
not in store for the armed forces that take over control in a nonviolently 
defended country, for even though the resistance may be forced into 
conceding power to the invader, that power will necessarily be limited First 
of all, the invader s power will be limited in kind Imposing restrictions on 
the freedom of speech and assembly, for instance, fall outside its scope Such 
restrictions would provide the population with concrete rallying points for 
renewed resistance and, thus, strengthen instead of weaken its position The 
invader s power is also limited by the rate at which it will be able to effectuate 
radical changes Abrupt changes m the system would provide the resistance 
with a new focus for effective protests To avoid this effect, the occupier 
would have to change the existing system slowly and gradually, with each 
change being too insignificant to provoke widespread protest
The power of the invader lies primarily on the economic level Instead 
of relying on pillage for its income, the invader could, through control over 
the production system, usurp the surplus value produced by the labor force 
The result for the population would be a considerable decline of its standard 
of living However, as the invader becomes more dependent on the 
production apparatus, strikes and economic boycotts against the occupation 
regime could regain effectiveness Therefore, if the occupier would revert to 
its obstruction strategy m response to them, its newly acquired management 
position would be undermined Rather than going back to square one, the 
occupier may thus seek social peace through negotiations, compromises, and 
concessions
Ultimately, then, the net material gains of the invasion may remain 
very humble An invader can never be sure of having eliminated the 
resistance Nonviolent protest movements can always flare up again and 
recapture terrain In terms of a cost-benefit calculation, this renders the 
invasion a dubious enterprise To be sure, risks are inherent m all political 
endeavors, and warfare is often considered as merely the continuation of 
politics by other means 12 There may seem little reason, then, to think that 
military powers are bound to shrink from mvading a country that defends its 
interests with nonviolent means However, a country that relies on a 
civilian-based defense is not m a worse position than a country that relies on 
a military defense There are no defense systems that can guarantee 
immunity from attack and neither are there any such systems that will always 
be able to defeat an attack Hence, the fact that non-lethal military aggressions 
may sometimes be able to eliminate civilian-based defense systems should 
not count as a decisive argument against adopting them
In conclusion, two results of the investigation should be stressed The 
first one is that military aggressors need not kill people If they direct their
©
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actions against nonviolently defended countries, they may (sometimes) attain 
victory through non-lethal strategies and, perhaps, more successfully so than 
by the massive use of brutal force The second result is that civilian-based 
defense leads to a radical redefinition of warfare Death and injury no longer 
play a dominant role, and the casualties become largely psychological ones 
Moreover, defeat and victory are not clearly delineated a country s resistance 
may seem to be crushed, but nonetheless regain its original power soon 
afterwards This last fact may in the end turn out to be the best deterrent 
against military aggression, for it robs such aggression of the promise of an 
ultimate and total victory
c j
NOTES
1 I would like to thank Jeff McMahan, Brian Martin, and Robert Burrowes 
for their comments on an earlier version of this paper
2 See his The Alternative to the Nuclear Deterrent Non-violent 
Resistance, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 103, February 
1958, pp 4-20, and Defence in the Nuclear Age, (London Victor Gollancz, 
1958)
3 For a somewhat outdated but otherwise excellent overview of the 
literature, see Herbert M Kntzer, Nonviolent National Defense Concepts 
and Implications, Peace Research Reviews 5, Apnl 1974, pp 1-57 More 
recent and introductory overviews can be found in Gene Keyes, Strategic 
Non-Violent Defense The Construct of an Option, Journal of Strategic 
Studies 4 , 1981, pp 125-151, and Jack D Salmon, Can Non-violence Be 
Combined with Military Means for National Defense7, Journal of Peace 
Research 25, 1988, pp 69-80
4 Gene Sharp, Making Europe Unconquerable, (Cambridge, MA Ballinger, 
1985)
5 Critiques of other assumptions in the arguments can be found in Thomas 
C Schelling, Some Questions on Civilian Defence, in Adam Roberts (ed ), 
Civilian Resistance as a National Defense, Harrisburg, PA, Stackpole, 1968, pp 
303-308, Edward B Atkeson, The Relevance of Civilian-Based Defense to US 
Security Interests Part II, Military Review, June 1976, pp 45-55, and Koen 
Koch, Civilian Defence An Alternative to Military Defence7 Netherlands 
Journal of Sociology 2 0 ,1984, pp 1-12
6 See, e g , Liddell Hart, Deterrence or Defense, (London Stevens & Sons, 
1960) pp 220-21
2 As Gene Sharp has put it Instead of striking indirectly at the opponent s 
military forces which are the outward expression of the opponent s power, 
the nonviolent sanctions strike directly at the sources of that power 
cooperation and obedience From The Role of Power in Nonviolent 
Struggle, p 21, unpublished paper, presented at the Conference on 
Nonviolent Political Struggle, sponsored by the Arab Thought Forum,
12
Ammam, Jordan, November 15 - 17, 1986 See also Anders Boserup and 
Andrew Mack, War Without Weapons, (London Frances Pinter, 1974)
8 Brian Martin has pointed out to me that at least one facet of symbolic 
intervention, namely fraternization, does not presuppose that the occupation 
troops are misinformed in order to succeed However, while this may be 
true, it is of minor importance here, for fraternization is especially important 
as a psychological tool to inhibit the invader s use of brutal force Since, m 
the case under consideration, the invader does not use such force anyway, 
fraternization can contribute little to frustrating the invader s goals
9 Here, as elsewhere m this paper, violence refers to violence against 
persons only, I follow the Oxford English Dictionary (1989, 2nd ed ) m 
defining violence as the exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, or 
cause damage to, persons or property, action or conduct characterized by this 
treatment or usage tending to cause bodily injury or forcibly interfering with 
personal freedom It does not follow from this definition that a military 
aggressor who refrains from using lethal force is nonviolent The violence of 
such an aggressor is merely physically—but not necessarily psychologically— 
less harmful and of a lower intensity than the violence one habitually expects 
from military aggressors
10 To be sure, the producers could go on strike and thus make the invader s 
source of income dry up But a prolonged food production strike, for 
instance, would cause far less harm to the occupier than to the local 
population who is dependent on that production for its survival Hence, as a 
method of resistance, it would threaten instead of bolster the opposition to 
the invasion
11 Robert Burrowes has pointed out to me that it is useful to distinguish 
between actions that are not violent and those that are nonviolent By 
stipulation, the latter category is smaller than the former (of which it is part) 
for it excludes actions, such as arresting people, that derive their effectiveness 
from being backed up by the threat of violence
12 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 
1976, p 87
LIBRARY OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
N O TICE: According to Sec. 19 
(a) of the University Statutes, 
all books and other library 
materials acquired in any man­
ner by the University belong to 
the University Library. When 
this item is no longer needed 
by the department, it should 
be returned to the Acquisition 
Department, University Library.
